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THE SUPREME COURT-THEN AND NOW
F EBRUARY, 1941, witnessed two events which may be said to
be the final touches to one of the most stirring chapters in
the life of the Supreme Court:
1. The retirement of Mr. Justice McReynolds-
The last to doff his judicial robes, of the "four dissenters" '
who so consistently, courageously and futilely opposed the social and
economic policies of the Roosevelt Administration and who so out-
spokenly championed the doctrine of judicial supremacy.2
2. The decisions 3 upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act 4-
Although the power of the legislature to establish minimum
wages for employees in industry was settled by a previous pronounce-
ment 5 of the Court, the unanimity of the Court in so forcefully sup-
porting the power of the Federal Government to regulate conditions
of labor in the production of goods for commerce and in so unquali-
fiedly rejecting the limitations upon the federal power once adopted
in the fanrious child labor case,6 makes the decision outstanding.
1 Mr. Justice VanDevanter retired in June, 1937, Mr. Justice Sutherland
retired in January, 1938, and Mr. Justice Butler died in November, 1939.
These three Justices together with Mr. Justice McReynolds constituted the con-
servative bloc of the Court. Their record of dissents in each recent case
brought before them which involved an extension of the governmental power-
federal or state-in the field of economics admits of no exception to or com-
promise with their view that economics is a matter solely for private undertaking
and control.
2 Mr. Justice McReynolds stated the position of the conservative bloc with
respect to the power of the judiciary to act as a superlegislature when in his
dissenting opinion in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 556, 54 Sup. Ct. 505
(1933) he said:
"But plainly, I think, this Court must have regard to the wisdom of
the enactment. At least we must inquire concerning its purpose and
decide whether the means proposed have reasonable relation to something
within legislative power-whether the end is legitimate, and the means
appropriate."
3 Darby Lumber Co. v. Administrator, C. C. H. Labor Service (3d ed.)§§ 51, 108 (1941) ; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (U. S.
1941).
452 STAT. 1060, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 201, 202, 203 (1938).
5 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937).
6 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1918).
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The evolution of the Court's role in the political and
economic life of the country, and the Court's reversal of its
long standing philosophy of the Constitution, shortly after
the President's proposal in 1937 to provide among other
things for the "constant infusion of new blood" into the
Supreme Court, makes a narrative of prime historical impor-
tance and interest. The Attorney General of the United
States has recently published a book which relates in most
effective fashion this history.7 To read it is to gain a vivid
picture of the drama of the Court's capitulation to the cause
of economic reform. The historical fact that is of outstand-
ing importance is: it was not through the eventual placing of
new appointees upon the bench of the Court that it became
"modernized" with respect to its social and economic consti-
tutional interpretations, but rather it was through the real-
ization upon the part of those members of the Court who held
the balance of power 8 that the Court could no longer justify
a construction of the Constitution which made it a barrier to
the effectuation of the desires of the majority of the people.
Hence, the Court has changed many of its earlier views in a
series of startling decisions and placed its blessings upon the
economic measures enacted at the insistence of the Adminis-
tration. The change in the personnel of the Court that came
7JAcxsoN, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941).
8 Outside the conservative bloc (see note 1, supra) of the Court, were
Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Roberts and Justices Brandeis, Stone and Car-
dozo. The latter three had consistently indicated a stand for the broadening of
governmental powers and, in general, their opinions were such that they were
regarded as a liberal group. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts,
although not as sharply divided from the liberal group as the conservative bloc
was from the remainder of the Court, were less definite in their positions, and
their votes were decisive in the numerous split decisions of the Court, which
had retarded or nullified progressive legislation. Prior to 1937, the Chief
Justice had indicated a more liberal view, but Mr. Justice Roberts sided with
the conservatives of the Court until March, 1937, when, in the 5 to 4 decision of
the Court in the West Coast Hotel case, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937),
he voted with the liberals and the Chief Justice to sustain the constitutionality
of minimum wage legislation. In the 5 to 4 decision of the Court in the
Morehead case (note 14, infra), 298 U. S. 587, 65 Sup. Ct. 918 (1936), which
was rendered just a few months prior to the West Coast Hotel case, Mr. Justice
Roberts had voted with the conservative bloc to nullify minimum wage legisla-
tion. In the two decisions on the AAA legislation, Mr. Justice Roberts wrote
both opinions; in 1936 he denied the power of the federal government to regu-
late agriculture (note 35, infra), but in 1938 sustained that power (note 33,
infra). In the earlier case, the legalistic issue was the power of the govern-
ment to tax for the general welfare and fn the latter case, the question was
confined to the power of the government to regulate commerce, but the funda-
mental issue seems to have been the same in both cases.
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about through the departure from the bench of the "four
dissenters" has only served to strengthen and make secure
the Court's already liberal view df the -meaning of the
Constitution.
What the new Court has done and is doing, is to remove
the restraints that the old Court had imposed and maintained
upon freedom of political action. The Court in its metamor-
phosis has merely permitted the legislative and executive
branches of the government to effectuate the ends that appar-
ently represent the desires of the majority of the people in
the nation-those same ends could be attained and undoubt-
edly would have been attained, time permitting, by the more
cumbersome and less practical method of constitutional
amendment. It seems that the Court for the present, at
least, has adopted the position taken so frequently by Mr.
Justice Holmes. Perhaps his position was stated no better
than in his disseiting opinion in the case of Lochner v. Yew
York 9 which involved a question of the validity of state legis-.
lation to restrict the hours of work in the baking industry:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I
agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long
before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my
duty, ,because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement
has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody, their opin-
ions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state
constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which
we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyran-
nical as this, and which equally with this interfere with the liberty
to contract. Sunday laws and usury laws are ancient examples. A
more modem one is the prohibition of lotteries. The liberty of the
citizen to do as he likes, so long as he does not interfere with the
liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some
well-known Writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post
Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money
for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The Four-
teenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics . . . Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices
which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a constitution
9 198 U. S. 45, 75, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
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is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views,
and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar
or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Con-
stitution of the United States.
II
To examine the conclusions reached in some of the more
important issues decided by the Court will indicate the ex-
tent of the restraints which may be imposed upon "liberty
and property" by the legislative power as now viewed by the
Court.
There is no phase of economic life which is of greater
importance or more far-reaching in its effects than that in-
volved in the relationship of employer and employee. The
right to make contracts of employment is an application of
the right of personal liberty and the right of private property.
This right, of course, is subject to the power of government to
make reasonable regulations in the interests of the general
welfare of its citizens. The extent to which the legislature
could go in validly regulating the employment' relationship
was extremely limited by the Court in the past. Legislation
seeking to improve the status of employees was regarded as
unconstitutional unless the statute could be shown to the
Court's satisfaction to be necessary for the protection of the
health, morals or the welfare other than economic of classes
of persons who, because of their especial conditions, were
thought in a sense to be under disabilities which would jus-
tify a degree of paternalism by the government, as in the case
of women, minors, or persons engaged in hazardous occupa-
tions.10 While hours of labor might be limited in the inter-
ests of the health or morals,1 the Court took the stand that
10 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 316, 1S Sup. Ct. 364 (1897) ; Mueller v.
Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (1908) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v.
I. C. C., 221 U. S. 612, 31 Sup. Ct. 621 (1911) ; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S.
426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (1917) ; cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup.
Ct. 539 (1905).
11 See note 12, infra.
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regulation of wages by the establishment of a minimum was
beyond the constitutional powers of the legislature. 12 Basi-
cally, the pervading concept was that employers and employ-
ees were upon equal footing and that to legislate with respect
to conditions of employment, for the purpose of improving
the economic status of employees, was to disregard a mandate
of the people as set forth in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution. In Adair v. United States Mr.
Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, said: 1-
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he
deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser
of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such
labor from the person offering to sell . . . In all such particulars
the employer and the employee have equality of right, and any legis-
lation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the
liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a free
land.
Such apparently was still the view of the majority of the
Court in its pronouncement made but a few months prior to
March, 1937, in a case 14 involving the New York Minimum
Wage Law for Women.
Came the dawn of a new day in March, 1937, when the
Court handed down a five to four decision 15 on the constitu-
tionality of a minimum wage law passed by the State of
Washington. The majority of the Court held that "regula-
tion which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is
adopted in the interests of the community is due process"
within the requirements of the Constitution. It observed that
"the community is not bound to provide what is in effect a
subsidy for unconscionable employers." Thus, in a complete
reversal of its previous stand the Court established the power
of the government to compel by direct action employers to
increase labor's share of the economic product. A unanimous
Court confirmed this when it recently passed upon the valid-
12 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1922).
13 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 174, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908).
'1 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 918
(1936).
Is West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937).
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ity of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.16 Both the
wage and the hour provisions were regarded by the Court as
minimum wage requirements but it went on to say that it is
no longer open to question that the legislature has the power
to fix maximum hours for both men and women.
It being settled that the legislature may set a minimum
upon wages and a maximum upon hours, it is timely to con-
sider whether the Court would sanction the imposition of a
maximum upon wages and a minimum upon hours. The con-
ditions which would give rise to the desirability of such legis-
lation are not remote. The power of the labor groups is grow-
ing daily and it may well be that "the interests of the com-
munity" will warrant before long legislative protection from
"unconscionable" employees as well as employers. Allega-
tions are being currently heard from many sources that the
rates of pay in some trades have reached a point where they
are exorbitant and are inimical to the interests of the com-
munity. Aside from an emergency, the need for placing a
floor under hours of work as well as a ceiling over them may
not be apparent, but neither can it b? said that the occasion
for such a step will not arise.
The evolution of judicial approbation of the exercise of
legislative powers in reference to the organization and activi-
ties of employee unions is not unlike that with regard to
wages and hours. The right of employees to combine and to
refrain from working is merely the simple application of the
right of personal liberty, and was given early recognition. 17
In the interests of the protection of the peace of the com-
munity and the avoidance of injury to tangible property,
restrictions upon these activities were upheld.'8 But, in gen-
eral, the disposition of the Court was to rule out legislation
which went beyond the elementary purpose of providing for
the peace of the general public and the safety of persons and
property. Legislation attempting to strengthen the bargain-
ing position of labor was clearly unconstitutional. Statutes
16 See note 3, supra.
7 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 175, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908);
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1922);
Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 320 (C. C. A. 7th, 1894) ; Iron Moulder's Union
v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th, 1908).
18 Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.- S. 306, 47 Sup. Ct. 86 (1926).
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declaring it to be illegal for employers to require as a condi-
tion of employment that employees refrain from membership
in a union were voided. 19 Enactments limiting the power of
the courts to grant injunctions in labor disputes were de-
clared invalid unless they could be interpreted as being
"declaratory of the law as it stood before." 20 Such measures
were regarded as being, or as permitting, an undue and arbi-
trary interference with liberty or property, and, as such,
were barred by the "due process" amendments.
Now, however, the pendulum has swung in the other
direction. Under the Nationa] Labor Relations Act,2 1 em-
ployers are prevented from discriminating with regard to
hire or tenure of employment for the purpose of discouraging
membership in a labor organization and from interfering,
restraining or coercing employees in their union activities.
The rights of employees to picket and to conduct boycotts, as
long as the picketing is unaccompanied by a breach of the
peace and as long as the boycotting is legitimate and not
merely a device to restrain trade or commerce, are estab-
lished.22 Anti-picketing statutes are declared void as an un-
warranted interference with freedom of speech and assem-
bly; 23 injunctive relief in labor disputes is obtainable only
under very limited circumstances; 24 and criminal prosecu-
tion under the anti-trust statute is practically nullified. 25
There is a growing concern not altogether without un-
biased support that the scales may have been tipped too far
in favor of employees and against employers. But if this be
so, it is .not the concern of the Court. Speaking of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, the Chief Justice said,26 "The
19 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908) ; Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921).
20 Duplex Printing Co. v Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1920);
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup.
Ct. 72 (1921).2149 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1935).
22 Lauf v. Shinner & Co., Inc., 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1938).
23 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940) ; Carlson v.
California, 310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).
24 Lauf v. Shinner & Co., Inc., 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1938);
Progressive Miners Corp. v. Peabody Coal Co., 75 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 7th,
1935) ; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 61 Sup. Ct. 552
(U. S. Feb. 10, 1941).
25 United States v. Hutcheson, - U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 463 (1941).
26 Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 33, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
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Act has been criticised as one-sided in its application; that it
subjects the employer to supervision and restraint and leaves
untouched the abuses for which employees may be respon-
sible; that it fails to provide a more comprehensive plan,-
with better assurances of fairness to both sides and with in-
creased chances of success in bringing about, if not compell-
ing, equitable solution of industrial disputes affecting inter-
state commerce. But-we are dealing with the power of Con-
gress, not with a particular policy or with the extent to which
policy should go."
If any example need be cited to show the application in
practice of the newly, acquired power of labor, there is none
better than that of the contract being currently negotiated
between the labor organization and the employers in the
clothing industry in New York City. Under its provisions,
the employers would be required to expend a named amount
of money for promotional and sales effort, and the standards
of efficiency in the operations in the shops are to be deter-
mined in conjunction with the union. This is believed to be
the first attempt to place in the hands of employees definite
authority over matters generally held to be prerogatives of
the owners and the management of a business.
The regulation of the employer-employee relationship
with its alleged inherent conflict of interests is but one phase
of the comprehensive, if not all-embracing, activity of the
government in ordering the economic affairs of the nation.
Legislative enactments providing for the regulation of prices,
for the regulation of production, and for the attainment of
that elusive goal, economic security for the individual, illus-
trate further the extent to which freedom of action by the
individual is being restrained.
The constitutionality of regulation of prices and produc-
tion by state and federal government is fairly well estab-
lished. In Nebbiz v. New York' 27 the Court said, "There can
be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate
measures, the state may regulate a business in any of its
aspects, including the prices to be charged for the products or
commodities it sells." So far as the requirement of due proc-
27 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934).
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ess is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional
restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy
may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and
to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose."
In cases decided in 1938, it was held that the constitutional
power of the Federal Government to regulate interstate com-
merce includes the power to fix prices. 28
The judicial attitude of limiting price regulation to busi-
nesses which are thought by the Court to be "affected with
a public interest",29 is abandoned and the determination of
the businesses to be so regulated, apparently will be left
largely to the legislative discretion in providing for the gen-
eral economic welfareY' It may not be amiss to observe that
the efforts of the Government to improve the economic status
of the lower income groups by legislation are incomplete if
confined to the objective of increasing their wages. The effect
of legislation leading to this result can be nullified unless
control is exercised over the cost of living. The real wages
of labor are measured by a combination of money wages and
the cost of living. Aside from its importance in relation to
current national defense problems, the activity of the De-
partment of Justice in enforcing the anti-trust statutes is of
basic significance.
The principal .purpose of the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act 31 was to regulate prices and production in the coal
mining industry. The question of the validity of the Act
was presented to the Court in 1936, and the Act was declared
invalid 32 not because of any judicial limitation upon the
power of Congress to regulate prices and production but only
because the Court at that time felt that labor practices in the
mining industry did not affect interstate commerce.
In upholding 33 the constitutionality of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938, 34 the Court affirmed the power of
28 United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993
(1938) ; H. P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U. S. 588, 59 Sup. Ct. 1019
(1938).
29 iMunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; cf. Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S.
418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
30 See note 9, supra.
3149 STAr. 991, 41 U. S. C. A. § 24a (1935).
32 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct 855 (1936).
33 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 59 Sup. Ct. 648 (1939).
34 52 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. § 423 (1938.).
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the Government to regulate production. Unlike the first
Agricultural Adjustment Act,35 which was based on the
power to tax for the general welfare, this Act concerned the
power of the Congress to restrict the marketing of a product
to a volume to be determined by the Department of Agricul-
ture. Obviously, a restriction upon marketing acts as a re-
striction upon production.
The question of price fixing and production regulation
in these cases was being considered as part of a plan for the
stabilization of an industry which was suffering from eco-
nomic distress. However, there can be little doubt that the
legislative power would be held to be no less present were
the regulation of prices and production part of a plan with a
different purpose, so long as the objective and the effect are
to promote the public welfare. It is significant to observe
that only recently the United States Department of Agricul-
ture in a report to the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee, has suggested government control of food distribut-
ing organizations in a "manner somewhat like that in which
public utilities are regulated."
The adversities of life, even when the economy is super-
vised by governmental action, continue to exist for the indi-
vidual. Old age, death and sickness are no respecters of a
planned economy and apparently in modern industrialism
there will always be the spectre of unemployment to haunt
the individual. A means for ameliorating the financial hard-
ships caused by the occurrence of these adversities may be
found in the use of the principle of insurance. Private ini-
tiative has gone far in providing the facilities to combat fi-
nancially the uncertainties. The opportunity is there for
individuals who have the perspicacity and the economic posi-
tion to avail themselves of it. However, for the majority of
individuals, adequate protection is not available and the
widespread economic insecurity gives rise to the need of so-
cial action. Hence, resort is had to a system under govern-
mental authority of compulsory contributions from private
resources to a public fund from which payments can be
35 52 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. §423 (1938). Declared invalid ii United
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
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claimed as a matter of right by individuals who become vic-
tims of the hazards contemplated.
There were many doubts expressed as to whether the
powers conferred upon the Government through the Consti-
tution would permit the establishment of a plan of social
insurance. Those doubts have been dispelled by the deci-
sions of the Court in upholding the validity of the legislation
creating a system of unemployment compensation and old
age and death benefitsA6 These measures were sustained on
the basis of the existence of a public need and in the interest
of the advancement of the general public welfare. It is in-
teresting to note that, with respect to the Federal Old Age
legislation, it is the first time that the Court found it neces-
sary to rule upon the implications of the general welfare
clause of the Constitution. The Court overruled the con-
tention that the power of the Government to provide for the
general welfare is limited to activities which are specifically
enumerated in the Constitution.37  The power of the legis-
lature to enact measures for the general welfare to the extent
that it deems such action necessary is established. Legisla-
tion providing for a system of health insurance is already
under active consideration and it may be expected that Social
Security will be extended in its application to meet other
specific needs. Recent suggestions, by governmental officials
to the effect that the privately-owned insurance companies
might well give consideration to the establishment of a sys-
tem of insuring businesses against failure indicates the ex-
tent to which the principle of insurance may be employed by
the Government in its efforts to attain an improved economy.
Illustrations might be multiplied in showing the extent
to which governmental action with the sanction of the Court
is imposing standards and regulations upon the economy and
is restraining individual action to a set pattern. The day of
the business man's laissez faire is definitely gone and the
influence of government upon the activities of production,
trade and finance is mounting almost daily. It reaches di-
36 Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 57 Sup. Ct. 868 (1937) ;
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (1937) ; Helver-
ing v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 57 Sup. Ct. 904 (1937).
3 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 57 Sup. Ct. 904 (1937).
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rectly into the affairs of every business and every home.
Control over the economic life of the nation is no longer vest-
ed exclusively or even principally in those whose source of
power is the ownership of wealth. It is rapidly passing into
the hands of those whose source of power is political and
popular and every indication is that the trend will be accel-
erated rather than retarded. Whether political control over
the economy will be more successful than private control in
improving the material well-being of the people can be de-
termined only by time and event.
III
If restraints through social legislation upon liberty and
property are sanctioned by the Court whenever and to the
extent that the popular will desires, the ultimate effect will
be to nullify the guarantees of the Constitution without di-
rect action of the people. So thought Mr. Justice Suther-
land, as expressed in his dissent 38 from the majority holding
in the revolutionary minimum wage law decision of 1937:
If the Constitution, intelligently and reasonably construed * * *
stands in the way of desirable legislation, the blame must rest upon
that instrument, and not upon the Court for enforcing it according
to its terms. The remedy in that situation-and the only true remedy
-is to amend the Constitution.
It is hardly debatable that adherence to orderly processes
requires that the voiding of any of the provisions of the Con-
stitution be only by direct action of the people. But what
are these terms, that the Justice referred to in his statement,
which dictate that property rights and liberty involved there-
with shall be impervious to qualification in the interests of
the common good. The Constitution will be searched in vain
for any statement which specifies that property rights are
immune from limitation or even abolition. Aside from the
provision for just compensation where private property is
taken for public use, there is only the restriction that no per-
38 See note 15, supra, 300 U. S. at 404. This dissent was concurred in by
the three other members of the minority bloc.
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son shall be deprived thereof "without due process of law." 31
The doctrine that this phrase was other than a specification
as to procedure-that it applies "to matters of substantive
law as well as to matters of procedure" is a creation of the
Supreme Court itself.40 For the Court now to limit the ap-
plication of that doctrine, insofar as it was thought to guar-
antee a maximum of individual self-assertion and freedom
of action with relation to economic activity can hardly be
said to effect a nullification of the Constitution. The most
that can be validly said is that, under its recent decisions,
the Court has revised its previous interpretations of the in-
strument embodying the fundamental law of the land.
Compare, however, the position of the Court on economic
matters with its attitude on issues involving the civil lib-
erties of individuals. The Court has not overruled since 1937
a major legislative enactment of an economic nature. How-
ever, with respect to issues involving the civil liberties, there
has been no hesitancy on the part of the Court in overruling
legislative and administrative action which would prevent
the exercise of the rights specifically guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. Handbill ordinances, anti-picketing laws, and bans
on public meetings have consistently been denounced by the
Court as a deprivation of constitutional liberties. 41 The
Court did deny, however, the validity of a plea that to re-
quire school children to salute the flag, when such an act was
contrary to the religious scruples of the children is an un-
warranted invasion of the guarantee of religious freedom.42
The Court's declination to weigh the legislative judgment in
this matter is difficult to reconcile with its action in other
cases involving civil liberties, particularly the cases involving
the anti-picketing statutes. 43  However, the decision in this
particular case of itself can hardly be taken, in the light of
39 U. S. Coxsr. AMENDS. 5 and 14.
40 Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in the Oklahoma Ice case, 285 U. S. 262,
52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
41 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938); Hague v.
C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S.
147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct.
736 (1940) ; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).
42 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010 (1940);
(1940) 15 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 95.
43 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940) ; Carlson v.
California, 310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).
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the Court's pronouncements in other cases, as cause for con-
cern with respect to the Court's disposition to protect civil
liberties.
Even the most reactionary person cannot deny with rea-
sonableness the need for changes in the social organism. The
need arises not out of any theories of the equality of man or
the practice of altruism but is because of the immeasurable
achievements of science and modern industrialism in the
quest for the greater satisfaction of the material wants of
human beings. This success has created a condition of human
interdependence which requires readjustment in economic
affairs.
Those readjustments can be made and are being made
within the framework of our American institution as estab-
lished by the fundamental law of the nation. Law in a consti-
tutional democracy is founded upon and should be responsive
to the needs and desires of society. The true judicial func-
tion, with respect to those matters upon which legislative
representatives have acted, is not to formulate or negate the
statutory rules of action, but primarily is to safeguard the
orderliness of the legislative process and the compatibility
of the resulting rules with the basic ideals and principles of
the nation. In determining upon the limitations which, con-
sistent with those ideals and principles, may be imposed upon
liberty and property, the Court, if it is to perform well its
true function, must take cognizance of contemporary condi-
tions and the desires of an informed and enlightened public
opinion as it evolves with the changing conditions.
The observations of Mr. Justice Cardozo, in his ad-
dresses on the nature of the judicial process, are pertinent.
In characteristic fashion he said: 44
I speak first of the constituion, and in particular of the great
immunities with which it surrounds the individual. No one shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law. Here is a concept
of the greatest generality. Yet it is put before the courts en bloc.
Liberty is not defined. Its limits are not mapped and charted. How
shall they be known? Does liberty mean the same thing for succes-
sive generations? May restraints that were arbitrary yesterday be
44 CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1925).
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useful and rational and therefore lawful today? May restraints that
are arbitrary today become useful and rational and therefore lawful
tomorrow? I have no doubt that the answer to these questions must
be yes. * * * Courts know today that statutes are to be viewed, not
in isolation or in vacuo, as pronouncements of abstract principles for
the guidance of an ideal community, but in the setting and the frame-
work of present-day conditions, as revealed by the. labors of econo-
mists and students of the social sciences in our own country and
abroad.
The degree of restraint upon liberty in relation to prop-
erty sanctioned by the present Court is undeniably much
greater than that sanctioned by the old Court. How much
of this is due to a change in the economic predilections and
an increase in the sociological sensibilities of the members
of the Court and how much of it is due to self-imposed limi-
tations upon the exercise of judicial authority to invalidate
the action of the legislative bodies is difficult to ascertain.
The language of the Court in some cases would indicate a
growing disposition upon the part of the Court to refrain
from acting as a. superlegislature. On the other hand, the
evidence, when viewed in the light of the nature of the judi-
cial process and the history of the Court, is insufficient to
sustain a conclusion that the Court has permanently and
completely abandoned its long-assumed prerogative of acting
as final arbiter with respect to the wisdom of the policy of
legislative enactments. The record does show, however, that
the new Court is ascribing to the meaning of the Constitution
a quality of flexibility in place of the old Court's concept of
rigidity.
EDWIN P. WOLFE.
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